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a b s t r a c t 
By using university administrative and survey data on Italian graduates, we analyse the intergenerational trans- 
mission of liberal professions. We ﬁnd that having a father who is a liberal professional has a positive and 
signiﬁcant eﬀect on the probability of a graduate of becoming a liberal professional. To assess the processes at 
work in this intergenerational transmission, we evaluate the eﬀect of having a liberal professional father on the 
probabilities to undertake each of the compulsory steps required to become a liberal professional, which are 
choosing a university degree providing access to a liberal profession, completing a period of practice, passing 
a licensing exam and starting a liberal profession. Having a liberal professional father has a positive and sta- 
tistically signiﬁcant eﬀect on the probability to complete a compulsory period of practice and to start a liberal 
profession; whereas there does not seem to be an eﬀect on the type of degree chosen and on passing the licensing 
examination, at least after controlling for child ’s and parental formal human capital. 
© 2018 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. 
This is an open access article under the CC BY license. ( http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ ) 
1. Introduction 
The focus of this paper is on explaining why children of liberal pro- 
fessional fathers have a larger probability to become liberal profession- 
als. We consider liberal professionals who are self-employed workers 
providing public services which require them to hold a speciﬁc univer- 
sity degree, to obtain a professional license by passing an exam and to 
complete a compulsory period of practice, which has to be undertaken 
before the licensing exam. 1 
By using university administrative data linked with post-graduation 
surveys covering the universe of graduates in 22 Italian Public Universi- 
ties in 2002 and 2003, we ﬁnd that the probability of a graduate child to 
become a liberal professional increases of 9 (16) percentage points when 
the father is a graduate liberal professional rather than an entrepreneur 
(a blue collar). These are huge increases, given that only 13% of gradu- 
ates become liberal professionals. 
Similarly to the intergenerational transmission of income, the oc- 
cupational transmission has been explained by inheritability of en- 
dowments and parents ’ investments in their child ’s human capital (see 
∗ Corresponding author. 
E-mail address: carmen.aina@uniupo.it (C. Aina). 
1 The liberal professionals considered in our empirical exercise are accountants, 
lawyers, notaries, psychologists, pharmacists and architects. In some of our auxiliary anal- 
yses, which are available upon request to the authors, we also include liberal professions 
that do not require a compulsory period of practice, i.e. engineers, geo-biologists and 
agronomists. 
Becker and Tomes, 1979; 1986 ). But, to justify a diﬀerent degree of 
transmission for diﬀerent occupations, it is necessary to recognise that 
there are two types of human capital investments: the indirect invest- 
ment through formal education and the direct investment through the 
transmission of job-speciﬁc abilities and knowledge from fathers to chil- 
dren (see Laband and Lentz, 1983; 1992, Evans and Jovanovic, 1989, 
Dunn and Holtz-Eakin, 2000, Fairlie and Robb, 2007 and Fairlie and 
Krashinsky, 2012 ). Liberal professions are a type of occupation where 
the intergenerational transmission of skills and knowledge is important 
and helps in lowering the entry barrier costs, e.g. shortening the time 
needed to set a portfolio of customers and increasing potential early 
proﬁts. 
If parental human capital investments were the only explanation for 
the occupational transmission from fathers to children, then there would 
be no reason for thinking that a high degree of occupational transmis- 
sion is unfair. However, other possible mechanisms explaining the trans- 
mission of liberal professions are: the transfer of ﬁnancial resources, 
job preferences, family networking and the potential transmission of 
the family business. 2 Furthermore, an additional mechanism which can 
explain the large intergenerational association in liberal professions is 
2 For a review of papers on intergenerational mobility see Solon (1999) , Björklund and 
Jantti (2009) , Erikson and Goldthorpe (2002) , Ermisch et al. (2012) and Torche (2015) . 
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nepotism, i.e. the fact that liberal professional fathers can help their 
children beyond their merits to be accepted and to complete a period of 
practice, to pass a licensing exam, or to undertake other steps required 
to become a liberal professional. 3 
We are unable to evaluate the separate eﬀect of nepotism; but, after 
controlling for variables which measure child ’s and parental formal hu- 
man capital, and child ’s job preferences and family ﬁnancial resources, 
we can interpret the residual eﬀect of having a liberal professional father 
on the probability of becoming a liberal professional as the combined ef- 
fect of transmission of job-speciﬁc skills and knowhow, nepotism, family 
networking and potential inheritance of the family business. While we 
capture the formal human capital by controlling for a rich set of mea- 
sures of educational choices and attainments in high school and univer- 
sity using administrative data, which are unlikely to suﬀer of measure- 
ment errors; our measures of ﬁnancial resources and job preferences 
are proxy variables which might not fully control for the two related 
transmission mechanisms. Nevertheless, because we compute the eﬀect 
of having a liberal professional father on the probability of becoming a 
liberal professional as the diﬀerential eﬀect with respect to having a fa- 
ther who is an entrepreneur and the transmission of ﬁnancial resources 
and job preferences is likely to be very similar between fathers who 
are entrepreneurs and liberal professionals, we expect the potential bias 
caused by these proxy variables to be small. 
The novelty of our paper is that we decompose for the ﬁrst time the 
probability of a graduate to become liberal professional in the product of 
four probabilities (processes) which represent four sequential steps that 
a child has to undertake to start a liberal profession, which are choosing 
degrees providing access to liberal professions which require practice 
period, completing a compulsory period of practice, obtaining a profes- 
sional licensing and starting a liberal profession. This approach allows 
us to evaluate the eﬀect of having a liberal professional father in each of 
these four speciﬁc processes and to explain how this eﬀect is mediated 
by diﬀerent mechanisms. In this way we can identify which process is 
the most important in explaining the intergenerational transmission of 
liberal professions, and therefore we can provide more precise policy 
recommendations to improve access to liberal professions. 
Our approach is similar in spirit to Mare ’s educational transition 
model, which estimates the eﬀect of parental background on the prob- 
ability of progressing from one educational level to the next using a 
sequential binary model (see Mare, 1979; 1980; 1981; 2011 ). The main 
diﬀerence is that, rather than evaluating the eﬀect of family background 
on school transitions, we estimate the eﬀect of parental occupation on 
sequential probability processes, which represent sequential steps that 
a child has to undertake to become a liberal professional. 
More precisely, we consider the full sample of graduates and estimate 
the eﬀect of having a father who is a liberal professional on each of four 
following probability processes: 
I.a the probability to choose university degrees that give access to lib- 
eral professions which require a compulsory period of practice, 
I.b the probability to complete a compulsory period of practice, 
I.c the probability of passing a professional licensing exam, 
I.d the probability to start a liberal profession. 
Each of these probabilities is conditional on having undertaken the 
previous step, i.e. completing a period of practice is conditional on hav- 
ing a degree that gives access to liberal professions which require a 
compulsory period of practice, passing a professional licensing exam is 
conditional on having completed a period of compulsory practice, and 
starting a liberal profession is conditional on having obtained a license. 
Therefore, the probability to become a liberal professional for a gradu- 
3 We deﬁne nepotism as any advantageous eﬀect of the family network which is not 
meritocratic. 
ate is given by the product of the above four conditional probabilities 
([I.a], [I.b], [I.c] and [I.d]), which are sequential probabilities. 4 
Our ﬁndings suggest that the completion of a compulsory period of 
practice and the liberal profession initiation are the major processes at 
work in the transmission of liberal professions from fathers to children. 
On the contrary, the type of degree choice and the licensing examina- 
tion do not play a major role in explaining the transmission of liberal 
professions. 
When controlling for the eﬀect of the observed mechanisms of trans- 
mission, i.e. for the transmission of ﬁnancial resources, formal human 
capital and job preferences, separately on the four diﬀerent probability 
processes, we ﬁnd that the advantage of having a liberal professional 
father in the same ﬁeld of study, (i) on the probability to complete a 
compulsory period of practice (process I.b), is mainly explained by the 
transmission of formal human capital followed by family networking 
and/or nepotism, (ii) on the probability to pass a licensing exam (pro- 
cess I.c), is explained exclusively by formal human capital, (iii) on the 
probability to start a liberal profession (process I.d), is explained by the 
transmission of the family business and possibly nepotism. 
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 sum- 
marises the literature related to our research. Section 3 provides some 
institutional details on the educational system and on the professional 
licensing in Italy. We then describe the data in Section 4 and provide 
descriptive measures of intergenerational mobility in liberal professions 
in Section 5 . We assess the eﬀects of having a liberal professional father 
and of diﬀerent mediating mechanisms on the probability of becoming 
a liberal professional and on the four diﬀerent sequential processes of 
intergenerational transmission in Sections 6 and 7 , respectively. Finally, 
Section 8 concludes. 
2. Related literature 
By assuming that the cost to acquire human capital related to a spe- 
ciﬁc occupation is lower for children who follow their father ’s occupa- 
tion and that fathers with a child who is a follower maximise their own 
earnings as well as their child ’s, Laband and Lentz (1983) develop an 
economic model which explains the mechanisms behind the intergen- 
erational occupational transmission and the diﬀerences in this trans- 
mission across occupations. Direct and indirect human capital transfers 
from fathers to children are assumed to be the mechanisms of inter- 
generational transmission at work, and the explanation given for why 
some types of occupations are more often transmitted than others is that 
they require job speciﬁc human capital that can be easily and cheaply 
transmitted from fathers to children. Laband and Lentz (1983) ﬁnd that 
for occupations where the direct transmission of job speciﬁc knowledge 
and abilities is more relevant, such as farmers and self-employed peo- 
ple, there is a higher percentage of children following their father ’s oc- 
cupation. High levels of intergenerational transmission have been found 
also by Dunn and Holtz-Eakin (2000) and Sørensen (2007) for self- 
employed people, by Lindquist et al. (2015) for entrepreneurs and by 
Pellizzari et al. (2011) for liberal professionals. 
Beside the human capital transmission, another possible explana- 
tion for the strong intergenerational association is the presence of credit 
market imperfections, which may lead to a failure of meritocracy (see 
Evans and Jovanovic, 1989, Dunn and Holtz-Eakin, 2000, Caselli and 
Gennaioli, 2005 and Fairlie and Krashinsky, 2012 ). Evans and Jo- 
vanovic (1989) propose an economic model for the decision to be self- 
employed, and they provide empirical evidence that wealthier people 
have higher probability of starting a self-employment activity. Dunn and 
4 In presence of omitted variables which aﬀect all the above four probabilities, the com- 
putation of the probability to become a liberal professional is slightly more complicated, 
because it requires the estimation of a joint quadrivariate probability model that allows 
for correlation between the error components in the four probability processes. In the 
paper we show that the estimation results obtained using separate sequential probability 
models and the joint quadrivariate probability model are similar. 
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Holtz-Eakin (2000) extend this model to allow for ﬁnancial capital 
transfers from fathers to children, so that the decision to become self- 
employed depends on the personal human and ﬁnancial capital as well 
as on the human and ﬁnancial capital transmitted from the father. 
There is also some empirical evidence that the probability of becom- 
ing a self-employed worker or an entrepreneur is higher for children 
whose fathers are wealthier (see Holtz-Eakin et al., 1994 and Parker and 
Van Praag, 2006 ). 
An additional potential explanation for the intergenerational occu- 
pational mobility, which has been mentioned but not formalised in a 
theoretical economic framework, is the transmission of preferences and 
attitudes from parents to children. For example, risk adverse fathers 
are less likely to become entrepreneurs and probably transmit their 
risk aversion to their children, who in turn will be less likely to be- 
come entrepreneurs (see Dunn and Holtz-Eakin, 2000 and Fairlie, 2002 ). 
Necker and Voskort (2014) provide some evidence on intergenerational 
transmission of risk attitudes looking at earnings risk. They ﬁnd that a 
child ’s earnings risk increases by 14% of a standard deviation for one 
standard deviation increase in father ’s earnings risk. This association is 
statistically signiﬁcant, but small in size. 
A further mechanism of transmission is nepotism, which may aﬀect 
the outcomes of school admission exams and licensing exams, and ul- 
timately the probability of starting speciﬁc occupations. 5 It is gener- 
ally diﬃcult to distinguish the roles of nepotism and of human capital 
transfers in the intergenerational occupational transmission. This is be- 
cause the intergenerational transmission of knowledge and the father ’s 
work network may increase intergenerational mobility without imply- 
ing favouritism (see Magruder, 2010, Ponzo and Scoppa, 2011b and 
Kramarz and Skans, 2014 ). It is perhaps easier to identify the contri- 
bution of nepotism when looking at exams for which the probability 
of success should be independent of the father ’s occupation once the 
child ’s ability is controlled for. An example of this is the licensing exam- 
ination in Italy, which is a mandatory requirement to become a liberal 
professional. 
Such licensing examination has been often accused of favouritism 
toward children of liberal professionals, but the empirical evidence is 
mostly anecdotal or based on statistical analysis that cannot adequately 
control for the intergenerational transmission of ﬁnancial resources, 
formal and informal human capital and preferences (see Basso and 
Labartino, 2011 ). The most convincing evidence on the eﬀect of fa- 
thers on children starting a liberal profession is given by Basso and Pel- 
lizzari (2010) . 6 Using local administrative registers of professionals in 
Italy, they ﬁnd a negative relationship between the age when people 
start a legal profession and the frequency of their family name in the 
local register. Since the frequency of their surname is likely to indicate 
family connections, the negative relation might suggest a potential ef- 
fect of nepotism on the probability of passing a license. The presence 
of nepotism is conﬁrmed by a comparison of the relationship between 
starting age of a legal profession and frequency of the family names be- 
fore and after the introduction of a reform aimed at reducing biases in 
the marking of licensing exams. The association between starting age 
and surname frequency decreases after such intervention, indicating a 
potential reduction in the nepotism eﬀect. 
A ﬁnal mechanism through which liberal professions get transmit- 
ted from parents to children is the potential inheritance of the fam- 
ily professional business which lower the entry barrier to the profes- 
sion. Bennedsen et al. (2007) ﬁnd a causal signiﬁcant negative eﬀect on 
5 Previous papers that have studied the eﬀect of nepotism include Lentz and La- 
band (1989) and Arulampalam et al. (2005) , who look at school admission; Pérez- 
González (2006) and Bennedsen et al. (2007) , who analyse the chief executive oﬃcer 
(CEO) successions; Basso and Labartino (2011) , who evaluate the eﬀect of nepotism on 
the starting age of licensed professions; Ponzo and Scoppa (2011a ), who study its eﬀect on 
recruitment; and Scoppa (2009) , who estimates the intergenerational mobility of public 
sector jobs. 
6 The main results are also summarised in Basso and Labartino (2011) . 
ﬁrms performance of the transmission of chief executive oﬃcer (CEO) 
positions from parents to children, which seems to suggest that the 
decision to appoint a family member as CEO is not so meritocratic. 
Grossmann and Strulik (2010) consider the intergenerational transmis- 
sion of ownership and control of a ﬁrm from parents to children. They 
develop a theoretical model to study whether preferential inheritance 
tax on family ﬁrms may lead to a cost for society because of the po- 
tential transmission of ﬁrms to heirs who do not necessarily have high 
entrepreneurial abilities. Calibrating the theoretical model using Ger- 
man data, they actually ﬁnd that preferential tax treatment of family 
ﬁrms worsen macroeconomic performance. Lindquist et al. (2015) fo- 
cuses on the transmission of entrepreneurship from parents to children 
and, by using Swedish adoption data, they ﬁnd that the most relevant 
factors explaining such transmission are post-birth rather than pre-birth 
factors. This result suggests that there are not strong genetic mech- 
anisms explaining the intergenerational transmission of entrepreneur- 
ship. Mocetti (2016) studies the intergenerational transmission of phar- 
macies in Italy. He ﬁnds that an increase in the cap imposed on the 
number of pharmacies per population (a decrease in rent) leads to a 
reduction in the intergenerational transmission of pharmacies, but has 
no eﬀect on the career choices of children of non-pharmacists. This ev- 
idence suggests that high entry barriers provide a beneﬁt to children of 
pharmacists and this advantage may lead parents to favour their child 
beyond their merit. 
To summarise, the main mechanisms at play in the intergenerational 
transmission of liberal professions are: (i) formal human capital; (ii) 
preferences for speciﬁc jobs, (iii) ﬁnancial resources, (iv) job speciﬁc 
human capital (informal human capital), (v) family network, (vi) nepo- 
tism, (vii) inheritance of the family business. Most of the above mecha- 
nisms of transmission of occupations have been emphasised also by so- 
ciologists, who stress that these occupational transmission mechanisms 
are relevant conduits for social reproduction (e.g. Grusky and Weeden, 
2001, Weeden and Grusky, 2005 and Jonsson et al., 2009 ). 
Our paper is also related to the literature on intergenerational mobil- 
ity and especially to contributions that study the mechanisms explaining 
the transmission of occupations from parents to children. An approach 
often adopted to investigate these intergenerational mechanisms is the 
decomposition of intergenerational association in the part explained by 
mechanisms (such as education, cognitive and non-cognitive abilities, 
and ﬁnancial resources) and in the residual part which captures the 
intergenerational association net of these mediating mechanisms. This 
type of approach was introduced by sociologists in the 60 ’s and 70 ’s 
(see Blau and Duncan, 1967 and Sewell and Hauser, 1975 ) and was 
soon after adopted by economists (see Conslik, 1974; 1977, Atkinson, 
1980 and Atkinson and Jenkins, 1984 ). 7 These studies have certainly 
helped in assessing the magnitude of some mechanisms in explaining 
intergenerational occupational mobility, but have left some more spe- 
ciﬁc occupational transmission mechanisms unexplored. 
To sum up, the contribution of existing literature has been to un- 
derline the role of diﬀerent mechanisms in explaining the intergenera- 
tional transmission of occupations. Nevertheless, the empirical evidence 
on mechanisms is still fragmented as most of the studies focus only on 
few mechanisms and are unable to evaluate the role of each of them. 
Our paper provides some more comprehensive analyses on the mecha- 
nisms looking at their eﬀects on the transmission of liberal professions 
from fathers to children as well as on the diﬀerent underlying processes. 
7 More recent empirical applications of this approach are provided by Bowles and Gin- 
tis (2002) , Black and Devereux (2010) ; Blanden et al. (2007) ; Smeeding et al. (2011) and 
Ermisch et al. (2012) . 
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3. Institutional background 
3.1. The Italian university education system 
In Italy all students with any type of high school diploma can en- 
rol in a university degree. High school diplomas are upper secondary 
qualiﬁcations, which are usually completed at age 18–19, and they can 
be academic ( licei classici and licei scientiﬁci ) or vocational ( istituti tecnici 
and istituti professionali ). 
In the period considered in our empirical exercise most of the Italian 
Universities were public and, with the exceptions of few departments 
(e.g. Medical Schools and Architecture), there were no university ad- 
mission exams. If students failed an exam or were unhappy with the 
mark obtained, they could re-sit the exam several times. Consequently, 
students usually took much longer than the minimum oﬃcial period to 
complete their degree. Four-year degrees were usually completed in an 
average of 7.5 years, with only one in eight students completing within 
4 years ( ISTAT, 2000 ). 
3.2. Professional licensing in Italy 
In Italy, as in many other countries, professional occupations are 
subject to a range of requirements to guarantee the acquisition of pro- 
fessional credentials (see Paterson et al., 2003, Catania and Monti, 
2011 and Pellizzari et al., 2011 ). The main four prerequisites generally 
required by all types of liberal professions are: (i) to have a university 
degree in a ﬁeld of study relevant for the speciﬁc liberal profession; (ii) 
the acquisition of professional experience through a period of practice 
and/or specialised courses; (iii) passing a licensing exam; (iv) becoming 
a member of a relevant formal professional body. 8 
Several liberal professions require a practice period spent under the 
supervision of a member of the relevant professional body and prac- 
titioners are not paid but may receive a fellowship. The length of the 
practice period is three years for accountants, two years for lawyers (but 
can be shortened to one year by attending a Law specialization school 
for two years), eighteen months for notaries, one year for psychologists, 
and six months for pharmacists and architects; while the practice period 
is not mandatory for engineers, geo-biologists, and agronomists. 
The licensing exam is compulsory and consists of one or more written 
tests and an oral exam. Generally, the licensing exam takes place once 
per year in diﬀerent provinces. There are no limits to the number of 
candidates admitted to the licensing exam and to the number of times 
an examination can be taken. Because the licensing exam includes an 
oral exam, it is impossible to guarantee the absence of interference with 
the examination committee ’s members to favour speciﬁc applicants. 
Candidates who successfully pass the licensing exam have to become 
members of a formal professional body ( Albo Professionale ) before start- 
ing their liberal profession. Except for passing the licensing exam, there 
are no other relevant prerequisites for the enrolment in the professional 
body. The main requirement for the members of the professional body is 
to respect the code of conduct set by the body, which generally imposes 
rules and restrictions on pricing, advertising and business structure. 
4. Data 
We use data from AlmaLaurea, which is a consortium of Italian Uni- 
versities whose aim is to provide employers with information on gradu- 
ates. Graduates ﬁll in a questionnaire at the completion of their degree 
( Proﬁlo dei Laureati survey) and are followed and interviewed again af- 
ter 1, 3 and 5 years from the degree ( Condizione Occupazionale dei Laure- 
ati survey). These last three interviews are computer assisted telephone 
interviews administered by trained interviewers. Information from the 
8 For more details on the institutional context of licensed occupations in Italy see 
Catania and Monti (2011) . 
four interviews is matched with students ’ details contained in the uni- 
versities ’ administrative data registers, so that for each cohort of gradu- 
ates AlmaLaurea is able to provide details on age, sex, area of residence, 
family background, educational choices and test scores pre and during 
university, labour market status during and after the university, occu- 
pational characteristics and wage after the degree. 
The initial survey at the completion of the degree covers almost the 
whole population of new graduates from the Universities belonging to 
the AlmaLaurea consortium. The response rates in these initial surveys 
are usually well above 90% for each cohort of students. Looking at the 
interviews 5 years after the degree the respondents still represent more 
than 80% of the population of graduates who answered the initial inter- 
view. 
4.1. Sample deﬁnition 
Our sample is given by all graduates in 2002 and 2003 and inter- 
viewed 5 years after graduation, i.e. in 2007 and 2008. We include 
all universities and departments belonging to the Consortium in 2002 
or 2003 except for Sport Science and Medical Departments and the 
IULM (Istituto Universitario di Lingue Moderne). 9 The universities in- 
cluded in our sample of graduates are the following 22: University of 
Bologna, Cassino, Catania, Chieti, Ferrara, Firenze, Genova, Messina, 
Modena and Reggio Emilia, Molise, Padova, Parma, Piemonte Orien- 
tale, Roma LUMSA, Sassari, Siena, Torino Politecnico, Torino, Trento, 
Trieste, Udine, and Venezia Architecture. We do not consider students 
that are older than 40 at the completion of their degree and the few ones 
that were resident in a foreign country or with a foreign high school 
diploma before starting university. 
Our ﬁnal sample of graduates includes 24,309 people, and we also 
consider the three following subsamples: 
1. the subsample of graduates with degrees providing access to liberal 
professions which require compulsory period of practice to obtain a 
license (11,308 individuals), 10 
2. the subsample of graduates with access to liberal professions who 
completed a compulsory period of practice (7,899 individuals), 
3. the subsample of graduates who completed a compulsory period of 
practice and passed a licensing exam (5,601 individuals). 
Because our analysis considers only liberal professions for which the 
university degree is mandatory, the probability of becoming a liberal 
professional without a degree is zero and when conditioning on hav- 
ing a degree we can focus on the sequential processes that occur from 
the choice of the type of degree to the entry into the labour market. In 
the Italian context the probability to get a university degree is much 
more related to parents ’ education than to parents ’ occupations (see 
Checchi et al., 2013 ); therefore, we do not expect any strong eﬀect of 
having a liberal professional father on the probability of graduating and 
so omitting to consider the graduation probability process should not 
bias our results. 
4.2. Variables deﬁnitions 
4.2.1. Dependent variables 
For our analysis we consider four dependent variables that are four 
dummy variables taking value 1 for graduates who choose a degree pro- 
viding access to liberal professions requiring a compulsory period of 
9 We exclude students graduating in Sport Science because of the very small sample 
size. Medical schools are excluded because, contrary to all other departments, they have 
very selective admission exams and almost all medical graduates end up obtaining profes- 
sional license. Finally, the IULM is dropped from the sample because it is the only private 
university and has a high incidence of missing cases for most of the variables in 2002. 
10 Liberal professions requiring a period of practice are accountants, lawyers, notaries, 
psychologists, pharmacists and architects. Therefore, degrees providing access to liberal 
professions requiring a period of practice are Business and Economics, Law, Psychology, 
Pharmacy and Architecture. 
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practice [I.a], and who complete a practice period [I.b], pass a profes- 
sional license [I.c] and start a liberal profession within 5 years from 
graduation [I.d]. Degrees for which more than 3% of the graduates 
obtain a professional licensing within 5 years from graduation are de- 
ﬁned as degrees giving access to liberal professions. Amongst them, the 
degrees requiring a compulsory practice period are Business and Eco- 
nomics, Law, Psychology, Pharmacy and Architecture, whereas those 
without mandatory practice are: Engineer, Geo-Biology, and Agricul- 
ture. The degrees with no access to liberal professions are, instead, Lan- 
guage and Linguistics, Modern Literature and Philosophy, Education, 
Political Science, Mathematics and Physics. 
Table A1 reports some descriptive statistics and shows that 46.5% 
of graduates choose a degree that gives access to liberal professions for 
which the period of practice is mandatory, 40.7% obtain a professional 
license, and about 13.0% of graduates become a liberal professional 
within 5 years from graduation. 
4.2.2. Explanatory variables 
To explain the probability to choose a degree with access to liberal 
professions requiring a compulsory practice, we use only child ’s charac- 
teristics observed at the start of the university, to explain the probability 
to complete a compulsory period of practice and to pass a licensing exam 
we consider also characteristics observed at the completion of the uni- 
versity degree, ﬁnally to explain the probability to start a liberal profes- 
sion we consider additionally characteristics observed once the licensing 
exam has been passed. 
The characteristics at the start of the university include a set of vari- 
ables that measure the child ’s formal human capital, which are: age at 
the start of the university and its square term; high school ﬁnal mark, 
which ranges between 36 and 60; high school type, i.e. a dummy vari- 
able taking value 1 for vocational high schools ( istituti tecnici and istituti 
professionali ) and 0 for academic high schools ( licei classici, scientiﬁci, lin- 
guistici and psico-pedagogici ); area of residence in Southern Italy, which 
is given by a dummy variable taking value 1 for individuals living in the 
Southern regions and the two main Islands and 0 for individuals living 
in the Northern and Central regions. 11 
At the completion of the university we control for variables measur- 
ing ﬁnancial resources, job preferences, and human capital. We proxy 
the ﬁnancial resources by using two dummy variables for having worked 
during university and having received a university scholarship, which 
only students from low income families are eligible for. To measure the 
graduates ’ preferences for jobs with high degree of autonomy and in- 
dependence and for jobs with high security, all graduates, at the com- 
pletion of university, are asked the following two questions: “How im- 
portant is high stability/security in the job you are looking for? ” and 
“How important is independence/autonomy in the job you are looking 
for? ” The answers are reported in a 5-point scale, where 1 means “not 
at all important ” and 5 means “extremely important ”. We measure the 
preferences for job independence and security by considering the self- 
reported levels of job preferences and their square terms. The variables 
measuring human capital are: a dummy for having graduated from a 
South university; a set of dummy variables for the ﬁeld of study; the 
ﬁnal university grade standardised at department level by using all the 
observations available in the sample; 12 the interaction term between the 
dummy for a Southern university and the standardised university ﬁnal 
grade 13 a set of dummy variables for 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5 or more years de- 
layed graduation (no delay is the reference category), where the delay 
11 This dummy is included to capture potential variation in the quality of high school in 
South regions. 
12 The unstandardised ﬁnal degree ranges between 73 and 111 (i.e. 110 cum laude ) and 
its mean and standard deviation are reported in Table A1. 
13 The dummy for a Southern university and its interaction with the standardised uni- 
versity ﬁnal grade are included to capture diﬀerences in the quality of the university in 
the South, but they can also capture potential diﬀerences in the probability of passing a 
licensing exam and starting a liberal profession in Southern regions. 
is computed as additional number of years spent to get a degree beyond 
the minimum period. 
To explain the probability to start a liberal profession, we consider 
two extra explanatory variables which are two dummy variables for hav- 
ing passed the licensing exam between 13 and 36 months from gradu- 
ation and between 37 and 60 months from graduation (having passed 
the exam within 12 months from graduation is the reference category). 
Conditional on the remaining variables, a delay in passing the licensing 
exam may be a signal of a lower human capital endowment. 
The bottom panel of Table A1 summarises the above variables by 
reporting means and standard deviations using our sample of 24,309 
graduates. The average high school ﬁnal grade is about 49 (out of 60 
maximum points) and only one in three individuals has a vocational 
diploma. The average age at matriculation is 19, and only 4.7% of the 
individuals complete their degree within the minimum required period. 
31.6% of the graduates were resident in the South of Italy before starting 
the university, but only 24.8% obtain their degree in a university located 
in the South of Italy. 64.4% of people in our main sample have some 
work experience during university. On average the level of preference 
for job security and independence is about 4, which is just below the 
maximum level of preference which is 5. 
4.2.3. Parents ’ occupation and education 
To study the eﬀect of parents ’ occupation and education on the prob- 
ability to choose a degree with access to liberal professions requiring 
a period of compulsory practice, we consider a set of dummy vari- 
ables to distinguish between fathers who are graduate liberal profes- 
sionals, non-graduate liberal professionals, 14 managers, entrepreneurs, 
self-employed workers, non-manual workers and blue collars; having a 
graduate father who is not a liberal professional; and two dummy vari- 
ables for mothers who are graduate and non-graduate liberal profession- 
als. 15 
Both self-employed workers and entrepreneurs work on their own 
account; but while entrepreneurs engage one or more employees on a 
regular basis, self-employed workers do not usually engage employees. 
Liberal professionals are self-employed workers who provide a public 
service which requires speciﬁc intellectual skills and an oﬃcial license. 
Both blue collar and non-manual workers are employees; but while the 
former include unskilled and semi-skilled manual workers, the latter in- 
clude technicians, teachers, clerical workers and lower supervisors. Fi- 
nally, managers are employees who have high managerial occupations 
such as directors, business executive, head teachers, university profes- 
sors and chief physicians. 
When modelling the probability to complete a compulsory period 
of practice, to obtain or to pass a licensing exam and to start a liberal 
profession, we consider dummy variables for having a graduate liberal 
professional father with the same degree, having a graduate liberal pro- 
fessional father with a diﬀerent degree, having a liberal professional 
mother with the same degree, and having a liberal professional mother 
with a diﬀerent degree or without a degree. Table A2 reports the mean 
of each of the dummy variables describing the fathers ’ and mothers ’ oc- 
cupation and education in the sample of 24,309 graduates. More than 
50% of the fathers are either blue collar or non-manual workers (19.1% 
and 31.5%, respectively), while 9.6% are liberal professionals, 4.6% are 
graduate, of this 1.3% with the same degree. Only 1.9% of the mothers 
are liberal professionals, whereof 0.1% with the same university degree. 
5. Measures of intergenerational association 
Let us denote the probability of a child of becoming a liberal pro- 
fessional within 5 years from graduation 16 conditioning on the father ’s 
14 For the parents ’ generation there are liberal professions that did not require a univer- 
sity degree, e.g. accountants. 
15 For parents who are retired, unemployed or dead we consider their last occupation. 
16 For brevity in the following we omit to specify “5 years from graduation ”. 
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Table 1 
Intergenerational associations in liberal professions: odds ratios. 
Father ’s occupation General odds ratios of being a liberal professional 
(1) (2) 
with or without with 
a compulsory practice 
Liberal professional 1.969 ∗ ∗ ∗ 2.005 ∗ ∗ ∗ 
(0.107) (0.121) 
Graduate liberal professional 2.440 ∗ ∗ ∗ 2.584 ∗ ∗ ∗ 
(0.174) (0.200) 
Non-graduate liberal professional 1.446 ∗ ∗ ∗ 1.383 ∗ ∗ ∗ 
(0.112) (0.122) 
No. of observations 24,309 
Father ’s occupation Profession speciﬁc odds ratios Compulsory practice length 
Pharmacist 74.416 ∗ ∗ 6 months 
(34.453) 
Accountant 12.438 ∗ ∗ ∗ 3 years 
(3.221) 
Notary and lawyer 9.540 ∗ ∗ ∗ 1.5–2 years 
(1.465) 
Architect 8.529 ∗ ∗ 6 months 
(2.312) 
Engineer 5.779 ∗ ∗ ∗ No 
(1.426) 
Geo-biologist 74.731 No 
(48.951) 
Agronomist 4.631 No 
(4.731) 
Notes: Standard errors are reported in parenthesis. ∗ p -value < .10, ∗ ∗ p -value < .05, ∗ ∗ ∗ p -value < .01. 
Notary and lawyer = liberal professional father with degree in Law. Accountant = liberal professional 
father with degree in Economics. Pharmacist = liberal professional father with degree in Pharmacy. 
Architect = liberal professional father with degree in Architecture. Engineer = liberal professional father 
with degree in Engineer. Geo-biologist = liberal professional father with degree in Geology or Biology. 
Agronomist = liberal professional father with degree in Agriculture. 
occupation by 
� � ( � � = 1 |� � = 1) , (1) 
where Y c is a dummy variable taking value one if a child becomes a lib- 
eral professional and zero otherwise, and Y f is a dummy variable taking 
value 1 if his/her father ’s is a liberal professional and zero otherwise. 
We begin by reporting in Table 1 the odds ratios, i.e. the ratio of the odds 
of being a liberal professional if one ’s father is a liberal professional to 
the odds of it if one ’s father has a diﬀerent occupation, 
� � ( � � = 1 , � � = 1) � � ( � � = 0 , � � = 0) 
� � ( � � = 1 , � � = 0) � � ( � � = 0 , � � = 1) 
. (2) 
The odds ratio measures the so called intergenerational exchange mo- 
bility, which is unaﬀected by changes in the frequency of liberal pro- 
fessionals from the fathers to the children generation. It measures the 
association between becoming a liberal professional and having a lib- 
eral professional father, which takes values greater (lower) than 1 when 
the association is positive (negative). 
This odds ratio is reported in the ﬁrst column in the top panel of 
Table 1 , while in the second column we report the equivalent odds ratio 
when considering only children who become liberal professionals after 
a compulsory period of practice which are the type of liberal profes- 
sions considered in our main analysis. In both cases, we ﬁnd that the 
odds to be a liberal professional if one ’s father is a liberal professional is 
about twice the corresponding odds than if one ’s father is not a liberal 
professional. We also compute the odds ratios when considering lib- 
eral professional fathers with and without a university degree and the 
transmission is much larger for graduate professional fathers (compare 
second and third row in Table 1 ). 
To check whether there are any diﬀerences in the degree of inter- 
generational transfer across liberal professions, we report the odds ratios 
computed by considering speciﬁc liberal professions in the bottom panel 
of Table 1 . 17 The odds ratios increase when considering liberal profes- 
sions for which there is a compulsory period of practice, especially if it is 
long (see column 2). The largest odds ratio is observed for pharmacists 
and this is likely caused by strict regulations which limit the number of 
new pharmacies and increase the likelihood that pharmacies be trans- 
mitted from fathers to children (see Mocetti, 2016 ). For geo-biologists 
and agronomists, for whom there is no compulsory practice, the odds 
ratios are large but they are not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from 1. These re- 
sults seem to suggest that high entry barriers to the profession increase 
the occupational transmission from fathers to children. 
6. Intergenerational association: diﬀerent mechanisms 
Let us consider the probability of a graduate of being a liberal pro- 
fessional conditioning on the father ’s occupation and education by 
� � ( � � = 1 |� � = �) , (3) 
where � = 1 , … , 7 ; Y c is a dummy variable taking value one if a graduate 
becomes a liberal professional and zero otherwise 18 D f is a categorical 
variable denoting his/her father ’s occupation, which takes value 1 for 
graduate liberal professionals, 2 for non-graduate liberal professionals, 
3 for managers, 4 for self-employed workers, 5 for non-manual workers, 
6 for blue collar workers and 7 for entrepreneurs. 
In column (1) of Table 2 we report the average marginal eﬀects of 
having a father in a speciﬁc occupation relative to having a father who is 
an entrepreneur on the probability of becoming a liberal professional, 19 
which are computed using the following formula 
� � ( � � = 1 |� � = �) − � � ( � � = 1 |� � = 7) for � = 1 , … , 6 . (4) 
17 We do not report the odds ratio separately for psychologists because there are only 
ﬁve fathers who are psychologists. 
18 For children we consider only liberal professions for which there is a compulsory 
period of practice. 
19 These average marginal eﬀects are computed considering a probit model for the prob- 
ability to become a liberal professional and using the maximum likelihood estimates. 
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Table 2 
Probability of becoming a liberal professional - probit model estimates. 
Father ’s occupation Average marginal eﬀect controlling for 
nothing ﬁnancial job formal parental all 
resources preferences HC HC variables 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Graduate liberal professional 0.082 ∗ ∗ ∗ 0.079 ∗ ∗ ∗ 0.082 ∗ ∗ ∗ 0.087 ∗ ∗ ∗ 0.051 ∗ ∗ ∗ 0.055 ∗ ∗ ∗ 
(0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.015) (0.016) (0.015) 
Non-graduate liberal professional 0.003 0.004 0.005 0.007 − 0.019 − 0.010 
(0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.013) (0.013) 
Manager − 0.022 ∗ ∗ − 0.022 ∗ ∗ − 0.017 ∗ − 0.020 ∗ ∗ − 0.030 ∗ ∗ ∗ − 0.024 ∗ ∗ ∗ 
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) 
Self-employed − 0.027 ∗ ∗ ∗ − 0.025 ∗ ∗ ∗ − 0.022 ∗ ∗ − 0.027 ∗ ∗ ∗ − 0.024 ∗ ∗ − 0.019 ∗ ∗ 
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.010) (0.009) 
Non-manual worker − 0.043 ∗ ∗ ∗ − 0.041 ∗ ∗ ∗ − 0.037 ∗ ∗ ∗ − 0.043 ∗ ∗ ∗ − 0.044 ∗ ∗ ∗ − 0.037 ∗ ∗ ∗ 
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.009) (0.008) 
Blue collar − 0.054 ∗ ∗ ∗ − 0.049 ∗ ∗ ∗ − 0.047 ∗ ∗ ∗ − 0.053 ∗ ∗ ∗ − 0.052 ∗ ∗ ∗ − 0.043 ∗ ∗ ∗ 
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) 
Entrepreneur (reference category) 
No. of observations 24,309 24,309 24,309 24,309 24,309 24,309 
Notes: Standard errors are reported in parenthesis. ∗ p -value < .10, ∗ ∗ p -value < .05, ∗ ∗ ∗ p -value < .01. Control variables are: 
(2) having worked and having received a scholarship during university; (3) job stability and its square term, job independence 
and its square term; (4) age at enrolment and its square term, vocational high school track, high school ﬁnal mark, university in 
the South, standardised university grade, interaction between South university and standardised university grade, dummies for 
graduation with delay; (5) graduate liberal professional mother, non-graduate liberal professional mother, non-graduate and 
non-liberal professional father; (6) all control variables. Sample of all graduates. 
We choose as reference category for the father ’s occupation the en- 
trepreneurs because their expected income is similar to the one of liberal 
professionals and both liberal professionals and entrepreneurs work on 
their own account, so that fathers with these two types of occupations 
are likely to transmit to their children similar job preferences (especially 
preferences for job independence and risk) and ﬁnancial resources. 20 To 
understand how the choice of the reference category aﬀects our results, 
we also report in the Appendix A the corresponding results when con- 
sidering blue collars as reference category (see Appendix A Table A3). 
The diﬀerential eﬀect of having a liberal professional father increases 
when considering blue collars (see Table A3 column 1) rather than en- 
trepreneurs (see Table 2 column 1), it goes from 8.2 to 13.6 percentage 
points, suggesting that the transmission of ﬁnancial resources and job 
preferences from parents to children is more comparable between lib- 
eral professionals and entrepreneurs than between liberal professionals 
and blue collars. 
To assess the role of diﬀerent mechanisms in explaining the intergen- 
erational association in liberal professions, we also compute the average 
marginal eﬀect of having a father in diﬀerent types of occupations on 
the probability of a child of becoming a liberal professional when con- 
trolling for a vector of characteristics X which captures family ﬁnancial 
resources, job preferences and formal human capital. We do this by es- 
timating a probit model for the probability to become a liberal profes- 
sional 
� � ( � � = 1 |� � , �) = Φ( − �0 − �� − 6 ∑
�=1 
� ( � � = � ) �� 
) 
, (5) 
where Φ denotes the cumulative function of the standardised normal, X 
is a row vector of explanatory variables, � is the corresponding column 
vector of coeﬃcients, � ( � � = � ) is an indicator function taking value one 
if the father has occupation j and zero otherwise, and �j is the corre- 
sponding coeﬃcient which measures the eﬀect of having a father with 
occupation j with respect to having a father who is an entrepreneur (ref- 
erence category). The average marginal eﬀect of having a father who is 
a graduate liberal professional with respect to a father who is an en- 
20 Using the Survey on Household Income and Wealth (SHIW) of the Bank of Italy over 
the period 1998–2010, we ﬁnd a very close value for the average net income of males who 
are liberal professionals and who are entrepreneurs, Euros 35,487 and 36,566 respectively. 
Using our main sample, we also ﬁnd a similar value for the average level of preference 
for job independence (security) between children of liberal professionals with the same 
degree and children of entrepreneurs, 4.016 and 3.951 (3.958 and 3.880) respectively. 
trepreneur is computed by considering the following diﬀerence in prob- 
abilities 
� � ( � � = 1 |� � = 1 , �) − � � ( � � = 1 |� � = 7 , �) = Φ(− �0 − �� − �1 ) 
−Φ(− �0 − ��) , (6) 
replacing the coeﬃcients with their maximum likelihood estimates and 
averaging over the full sample. The average marginal eﬀects for fathers 
with other occupations are computed in a similar way. 
Table 2 reports the average marginal eﬀects of having a father in 
speciﬁc occupations on the probability to become a liberal professional 
unconditional on covariates i.e. controlling for: nothing (column 1); ﬁ- 
nancial resources (column 2); job preferences (column 3); formal human 
capital (HC) at the start of the university and at the completion of the 
university (column 4); parental human capital (HC) (column 5); and all 
variables together (column 6). The detailed list of variables is reported 
at the bottom of Table 2 . Each column reports the average marginal ef- 
fects of having a father with diﬀerent types of occupation with respect 
to having an entrepreneur father but using a diﬀerent set of variables X . 
The eﬀect of having a non-graduate liberal professional father is not 
signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero; conversely, the eﬀect of having a grad- 
uate liberal professional father is 0.082 but reduces to 0.055 once con- 
trolled for all observed variables (see Table 2 columns 1 and 6). This 
residual captures the eﬀects of nepotism and family networking and, 
only for liberal professional fathers with the same degree, the transmis- 
sion of job speciﬁc formal human capital and family business. In the 
following section we better identify and explain the separate contribu- 
tion of these residual mechanisms. 
7. The eﬀect of mechanisms on diﬀerent processes 
In this section we decompose the probability of becoming a liberal 
professional in the product of four sequential probabilities, which are 
the probabilities of (I.a) choosing a degree with access to a liberal profes- 
sion which requires a compulsory period of practice, (I.b) completing a 
period of compulsory practice, (I.c) obtaining a professional license and 
(I.d) starting a liberal profession. Furthermore, we allow each of these 
probability processes to be explained diﬀerently by observed character- 
istics, which are measures of ﬁnancial resources, job preferences, child ’s 
formal human capital, parental occupation and education, by estimating 
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the four following sequential probit models 
[ �.� ] Pr 
(
� � 
1 = 1 
|||� � , � 1 ) = Φ(� � �1 + � 1 �1 ), 
[ �.� ] Pr 
(
� � 
2 = 1 
|||� � , � 2 , � � 1 = 1 ) = Φ(� � �1 + � 2 �1 ), 
[ �.� ] Pr 
(
� � 
3 = 1 
|||� � , � 2 , � � 2 = 1 ) = Φ(� � �2 + � 2 �2 ), 
[ �.� ] Pr 
(
� � 
4 = 1 
|||� � , � 3 , � � 3 = 1 ) = Φ(� � �3 + � 3 �3 ), 
(7) 
where � � 
1 
, � � 
2 
, � � 
3 
and � � 
4 
, are dummy variables which take value 1 re- 
spectively if the child chooses a degree with access to a liberal profession 
which requires a compulsory period of practice, completes a compulsory 
period of practice, passes the licensing exam and starts a liberal profes- 
sion; Φ denotes the cumulative function of the standardised normal; X C 
is a vector of common explanatory variables for all four models, which 
includes a constant and the set of dummies for diﬀerent father ’s occupa- 
tions with the usual reference category “entrepreneur ”; Z s is a vector of 
extra explanatory variables; and �s and �s are the vectors of coeﬃcients 
for X C and Z s . The list of explanatory variables used for each of the four 
models are described in Table 3 . 
We can express the probability of a graduate of becoming a liberal 
professional as the product of the above four conditional probabilities, 
i.e. 
� � ( � � = 1 |� � , �) = � � ( � � 
1 = 1 |� � , � 1 ) � � ( � � 2 = 1 |� � , � 2 , � � 1 = 1) 
� � ( � � 
3 = 1 |� � , � 2 , � � 2 = 1 , � � 1 = 1) 
� � ( � � 
4 = 1 |� � , � 3 , � � 3 = 1 , � � 2 = 1 , � � 1 = 1) . (8) 
Therefore, the eﬀect of having a liberal professional father in each of 
these probability models captures the strength of transmission of liberal 
professions through each of the four sequential processes. 
In Tables 4–7 we report the average marginal eﬀects of having a 
father in each of the diﬀerent occupations with respect to having an en- 
trepreneur father on the four probabilities processes, unconditional on 
covariates i.e. controlling for: nothing (column 1); ﬁnancial resources (col- 
umn 2); job preferences (column 3); formal human capital (HC) (column 
4); parental human capital (HC) (column 5); and all variables together 
(column 6). 21 In Appendix B we also consider the same sequential model 
estimated using a joint quadrivariate probit model (see Table B1) and 
results are similar. 
The choice of a degree which provides access to a liberal profession 
is taken before starting the university, therefore to explain the degree 
choice we consider only explanatory variables which are observed be- 
fore or at the start of the university. Consequently, we do not control for 
the job preferences, which are reported after the completion of the de- 
gree, the dummies for having had a scholarship and having worked dur- 
ing the university, and the university ﬁnal grade. Nevertheless, because 
our reference category for the father ’s occupation is the entrepreneur 
and because the intergenerational transmission of job preferences, ﬁ- 
nancial resources and formal human capital is likely to be similar for 
entrepreneur and liberal professional fathers, we believe that our esti- 
mated eﬀect of having a father liberal professional in column (6) is net 
of these three transmission mechanisms. 
We ﬁnd that the average marginal eﬀect of having a father who is 
a graduate liberal professional is not statistically signiﬁcantly diﬀerent 
from having a father who is an entrepreneur. 22 On the contrary, the 
eﬀect of having a graduate liberal professional father is statistically sig- 
niﬁcantly higher than having a father who is a blue collar (see Table 
A5a). These results suggest that after controlling for transmission of ﬁ- 
nancial resources, job preferences and formal human capital, which are 
likely to be similar for fathers who are entrepreneurs and who are grad- 
uate liberal professionals, the residual transmission mechanisms do not 
play a role in explaining the degree choice. 
21 The eﬀects of the remaining explanatory variables for each of the probit models when 
controlling for all variables together are reported in Appendix A Table A4. 
22 Henceforth when speaking about signiﬁcance we mean statistically signiﬁcance at 5% 
level. 
We ﬁnd a negative eﬀect of having a father who is a non-graduate 
liberal professional with respect to having an entrepreneur father (see 
second row in Table 4 ), which persists even after controlling of all ex- 
planatory variables observed before or at the start of the university. 
The diﬀerential eﬀect can be caused by the diﬀerence in the transmis- 
sion of human capital given that we now consider a liberal professional 
father who is not graduate. Conversely, we ﬁnd no eﬀect of having a 
father who is a non-graduate liberal professional with respect to hav- 
ing a father who is a blue collar (see Table A5a). This seems to suggest 
that non-graduate liberal professionals transmit to their child a level of 
formal human capital similar to the blue-collars ’ one and lower than 
the entrepreneurs ’ one. We ﬁnd similar types of results also when we 
consider the probability of choosing a degree providing access to lib- 
eral professions without restricting the professions to the ones requiring 
a compulsory period of practice. 23 Ultimately, our results suggest that 
children of liberal professional fathers are not more likely to choose de- 
grees which provide access to liberal professions. 
Looking at the probability to complete a period of practice without 
controlling for any variable (see Table 5 column (1)), we ﬁnd a large ef- 
fect of having a liberal professional father, 26.1, 12.7 ad 9.1 percentage 
points for liberal professional fathers with the same degree, with a dif- 
ferent degree and with no degree. This eﬀect does not seem explained 
by the observed variables measuring job preferences and ﬁnancial re- 
sources (see columns (2) and (3)), but it is explained by the transmission 
of formal human capital. Once controlled for all covariates, the eﬀects 
reduce of about 30%, 80% and 60% for liberal professional fathers with 
the same degree, with a diﬀerent degree and without a degree, respec- 
tively. Findings are very similar when considering as reference category 
fathers who are blue collars rather than entrepreneurs (See Table A5b). 
These similarities in results reinforce our belief that it is not the trans- 
mission of ﬁnancial resources and job preferences (which are similar 
between liberal professionals and entrepreneurs but not between liberal 
professionals and blue collars) that explain the eﬀect of having a liberal 
professional father on the probability to complete a compulsory period 
of practice. 
Notice that most of the eﬀect of liberal professional fathers without 
a degree or with a diﬀerent degree on the probability of their child to 
complete a compulsory period of practice cancels out once controlled 
for all covariates. This suggests there are no other relevant mechanisms 
through which the intergenerational transmission aﬀects the probabil- 
ity of completing a compulsory period of practice. On the contrary, the 
eﬀect of liberal professional fathers with the same degree remains large 
even after controlling for the transmission of formal human capital, im- 
plying that there are other relevant mechanisms, in particular the nepo- 
tism and family networking and the transmission of job speciﬁc infor- 
mal human capital and of family business. We try to net out the eﬀect 
of transmission of family business by excluding all individuals who re- 
port that they are working in a family business 5 years after graduation 
irrelevant of their occupation, and we ﬁnd that the eﬀect of having a 
liberal professional father with the same degree after controlling for all 
covariates is still very large (see Appendix A Table A6). This seems to 
suggest that the transmission of family business has probably a small 
role in explaining the probability to complete a period of compulsory 
practice. 
Because all individuals who complete a compulsory period of prac- 
tice do attempt to pass the licensing exam, we can interpret the esti- 
mated eﬀect of having a liberal professional father on the probability of 
obtaining a license as the eﬀect on the probability of passing a licens- 
ing exam. By comparing our probability of passing a licensing exam by 
type of liberal profession with the corresponding licensing passing rate 
published in “Il Sole 24 Ore ”, 24 we ﬁnd indeed that our licensing suc- 
23 Results are available upon request to the authors. 
24 “Il Sole 24 Ore ” is the main Italian daily business newspaper and we considered the 
issue published on the 7th of January 2013. 
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Table 3 
Control variables in the four sequential processes. 
Probability of Control variables for 
father ’s occupation ﬁnancial resources job preferences formal HC parental HC 
I.a - choosing a Graduate liberal professional Age at enrolment and its square term Graduate liberal 
degree providing Non-graduate liberal professional Vocational high school professional mother 
access to liberal Manager High school ﬁnal mark Non-graduate liberal 
professions requiring Self-employed Living in Southern regions professional mother 
a compulsory Non-manual worker Non-graduate and non-liberal 
practice period Blue collar professional father 
Father ’s occupation (1): Financial resources (1): Job preferences (1): Formal HC (1): Parental HC (1): 
Graduate liberal professional with the same degree Having worked Job stability and Age at enrolment and its square term Graduate liberal professional 
I.b - completing a Graduate liberal professional with a diﬀerent degree during university its square term Vocational high school mother with the same degree 
compulsory Non-graduate liberal professional Having received a Job independence and High school ﬁnal mark Non-graduate or graduate with a diﬀerent 
period of practice Manager scholarship its square term Field of study degree liberal professional mother 
Self-employed University in the South Non-graduate and non-liberal 
Non-manual worker Std. university grade professional father 
Blue collar Interaction between South university 
and std. university grade 
Graduation with delay 
I.c - passing a Father ’s occupation (1) Financial resources (1) Job preferences (1) Formal HC (1) Parental HC (1) 
professional license See above list See above list See above list See above list See above list 
Father ’s occupation (1) Financial resources (1) Job preferences (1) Formal HC (1) plus Parental HC (1) 
I.d - starting a See above list See above list See above list having passed licensing See above list 
liberal profession exam 3 years and 
5 years after 
graduation 
1
1
6
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Table 4 
Probability of choosing a degree providing access to liberal professions requiring a compulsory period of practice [I.a] - probit 
model estimates. 
Father ’s occupation Average marginal eﬀect controlling for 
nothing ﬁnancial job formal parental all 
resources preferences HC HC variables 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Graduate liberal professional − 0.001 0.023 − 0.001 0.008 
(0.019) (0.019) (0.021) (0.021) 
Non-graduate liberal professional − 0.106 ∗ ∗ ∗ − 0.096 ∗ ∗ ∗ − 0.107 ∗ ∗ ∗ − 0.111 ∗ ∗ ∗ 
(0.018) (0.018) (0.021) (0.021) 
Manager − 0.079 ∗ ∗ ∗ − 0.059 ∗ ∗ − 0.078 ∗ ∗ ∗ − 0.063 ∗ ∗ ∗ 
(0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) 
Self-employed − 0.076 ∗ ∗ ∗ − 0.077 ∗ ∗ ∗ − 0.076 ∗ ∗ ∗ − 0.075 ∗ ∗ ∗ 
(0.015) (0.014) (0.015) (0.014) 
Non-manual worker − 0.116 ∗ ∗ ∗ − 0.109 ∗ ∗ ∗ − 0.116 ∗ ∗ ∗ − 0.109 ∗ ∗ ∗ 
(0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) 
Blue collar − 0.129 ∗ ∗ ∗ − 0.133 ∗ ∗ ∗ − 0.129 ∗ ∗ ∗ − 0.131 ∗ ∗ ∗ 
(0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) 
Entrepreneur (reference category) 
No. of observations 24,309 24,309 24,309 24,309 
Notes: Standard errors are reported in parenthesis. ∗ p -value < .10, ∗ ∗ p -value < .05, ∗ ∗ ∗ p -value < .01. Control variables 
are: (4) age at enrolment and its square term, vocational high school track, high school ﬁnal mark, living in Southern regions; 
(5) graduate liberal professional mother, non-graduate liberal professional mother, non-graduate and non-liberal professional 
father; (6) all control variables. Sample of all graduates. 
Table 5 
Probability of completing a compulsory period of practice [I.b] - probit model estimates. 
Father ’s occupation Average marginal eﬀect controlling for 
nothing ﬁnancial job formal parental all 
resources preferences HC HC variables 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Graduate liberal professional 0.261 ∗ ∗ ∗ 0.250 ∗ ∗ ∗ 0.261 ∗ ∗ ∗ 0.190 ∗ ∗ ∗ 0.236 ∗ ∗ ∗ 0.178 ∗ ∗ ∗ 
with the same degree (0.022) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.026) (0.026) 
Graduate liberal professional 0.127 ∗ ∗ ∗ 0.117 ∗ ∗ ∗ 0.129 ∗ ∗ ∗ 0.040 ∗ 0.086 ∗ ∗ ∗ 0.027 
with a diﬀerent degree (0.026) (0.026) (0.026) (0.023) (0.030) (0.026) 
Non-graduate liberal professional 0.091 ∗ ∗ ∗ 0.090 ∗ ∗ ∗ 0.094 ∗ ∗ ∗ 0.042 ∗ ∗ 0.048 ∗ 0.037 ∗ 
(0.024) (0.023) (0.024) (0.020) (0.028) (0.022) 
Manager 0.032 ∗ 0.024 0.042 ∗ ∗ − 0.003 0.015 − 0.004 
(0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.015) (0.019) (0.015) 
Self-employed 0.003 0.000 0.011 0.001 0.010 0.010 
(0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.015) (0.019) (0.015) 
Non-manual worker 0.039 ∗ ∗ 0.029 ∗ 0.045 ∗ ∗ ∗ − 0.003 0.038 ∗ ∗ 0.003 
(0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.014) (0.017) (0.014) 
Blue collar 0.001 − 0.007 0.010 − 0.009 0.007 0.004 
(0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.015) (0.018) (0.015) 
Entrepreneur (reference category) 
No. of observations 11,308 11,308 11,308 11,308 11,308 11,308 
Notes: Standard errors are reported in parenthesis. ∗ p -value < .10, ∗ ∗ p -value < .05, ∗ ∗ ∗ p -value < .01. Control variables 
are: (2) having worked and having received a scholarship during university; (3) job stability and its square term, job 
independence and its square term; (4) age at enrolment and its square term, vocational high school track, high school 
ﬁnal mark, university in the South, ﬁeld of study, standardised university grade, interaction between South university 
and standardised university grade, dummies for graduation with delay; (5) graduate liberal professional mother with the 
same degree, non-graduate or graduate with ad diﬀerent degree liberal professional mother, non-graduate and non-liberal 
professional father; (6) all control variables. Sample of graduates who chose a degree with access to liberal professions 
which require a compulsory period of practice. 
cess rates are comparable or even slightly higher. For this reason, we 
rename the probability of obtaining a license conditional on completing 
a practice period as the probability of passing the licensing exam. 
Looking at the results for the probability of passing a licensing exam 
conditional on having completed a compulsory period of practice in 
Table 6 , we ﬁnd that the eﬀect of having a liberal professional father is 
at most of 6 percentage points when omitting to control for any covari- 
ate and it is completely explained by the transmission of formal human 
capital. These results suggest that neither nepotism nor the transmis- 
sion of job speciﬁc skills aﬀect the probability to pass a licensing exam. 
Notice that family networking and the transmission of family business 
cannot aﬀect the probability to pass a licensing exam because the only 
way they could have an eﬀect is through nepotism. These results are 
conﬁrmed when blue collar fathers are used as reference category (see 
Table A5c). 
Finally, looking at the probability of starting a liberal profession 
without controlling for any covariate (see column (1) Table 7 ), we ﬁnd 
an average marginal eﬀect of 13.5 and 7 percentage points for liberal 
professional fathers with the same degree and with a diﬀerent degree, 
and no statistically signiﬁcant eﬀect for fathers who are non-graduate 
liberal professionals. Controlling for all covariates, the eﬀect of liberal 
professional fathers with the same degree reduces to 8.4 percentage 
points and makes the eﬀect of liberal professional fathers with a diﬀer- 
ent degree statistically insigniﬁcant. Financial resources and job pref- 
erences do not seem to explain any of these eﬀects; whereas variables 
measuring formal human capital such the standardised university de- 
gree and the dummy variables for a delayed graduation, have a statis- 
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Table 6 
Probability of passing a licensing exam [I.c] - probit model estimates. 
Father ’s occupation Average marginal eﬀect controlling for 
nothing ﬁnancial job formal parental all 
resources preferences HC HC variables 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Graduate liberal professional 0.054 0.054 0.054 0.048 ∗ 0.016 0.038 
with the same degree (0.033) (0.033) (0.033) (0.027) (0.038) (0.030) 
Graduate liberal professional 0.063 ∗ ∗ 0.062 ∗ ∗ 0.063 ∗ ∗ 0.010 0.027 del- − 0.000 
with a diﬀerent degree (0.030) (0.030) (0.030) (0.027) (0.034) (0.029) 
Non-graduate liberal professional 0.060 ∗ ∗ 0.058 ∗ ∗ 0.061 ∗ ∗ 0.007 0.022 del- − 0.001 
(0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.024) (0.032) (0.027) 
Manager 0.003 0.002 0.003 − 0.031 ∗ − 0.014 − 0.034 ∗ 
(0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.018) (0.022) (0.019) 
Self-employed − 0.014 − 0.019 − 0.013 − 0.030 − 0.009 − 0.027 
(0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.019) (0.022) (0.019) 
Non-manual worker − 0.010 − 0.019 − 0.009 − 0.045 ∗ ∗ ∗ − 0.011 − 0.044 ∗ ∗ ∗ 
(0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.017) (0.020) (0.017) 
Blue collar − 0.019 − 0.036 − 0.017 − 0.049 ∗ ∗ ∗ − 0.013 − 0.044 ∗ ∗ 
(0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.018) (0.022) (0.019) 
Entrepreneur (reference category) 
No. of observations 7,899 7,899 7,899 7,899 7,899 7,899 
Notes: Standard errors are reported in parenthesis. ∗ p -value < .10, ∗ ∗ p -value < .05, ∗ ∗ ∗ p -value < .01. Control variables 
are: (2) having worked and having received a scholarship during university; (3) job stability and its square term, job 
independence and its square term; (4) age at enrolment and its square term, vocational high school track, high school 
ﬁnal mark, university in the South, ﬁeld of study, standardised university grade, interaction between South university 
and standardised university grade, dummies for graduation with delay; (5) graduate liberal professional mother with the 
same degree, non-graduate or graduate with ad diﬀerent degree liberal professional mother, non-graduate and non-liberal 
professional father; (6) all control variables. Sample of graduates who chose a degree with access to liberal professions 
which require a compulsory period of practice and completed a compulsory period of practice. 
Table 7 
Probability of starting a liberal profession [I.d] - probit model estimates . 
Father ’s occupation Average marginal eﬀect controlling for 
nothing ﬁnancial job formal parental all 
resources preferences HC HC variables 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Graduate liberal professional 0.135 ∗ ∗ ∗ 0.139 ∗ ∗ ∗ 0.133 ∗ ∗ ∗ 0.113 ∗ ∗ ∗ 0.102 ∗ ∗ 0.084 ∗ ∗ 
with the same degree (0.044) (0.044) (0.044) (0.038) (0.048) (0.041) 
Graduate liberal professional 0.070 ∗ 0.072 ∗ 0.069 ∗ 0.053 0.036 0.030 
with a diﬀerent degree (0.040) (0.040) (0.040) (0.035) (0.044) (0.038) 
Non-graduate liberal professional 0.010 0.008 0.015 0.024 − 0.024 0.006 
(0.036) (0.036) (0.036) (0.031) (0.041) (0.035) 
Manager − 0.042 − 0.038 − 0.033 − 0.033 − 0.056 ∗ − 0.037 
(0.028) (0.028) (0.028) (0.024) (0.029) (0.025) 
Self-employed − 0.037 − 0.030 − 0.029 − 0.006 − 0.032 0.003 
(0.029) (0.029) (0.029) (0.025) (0.029) (0.025) 
Non-manual worker − 0.098 ∗ ∗ ∗ − 0.085 ∗ ∗ ∗ − 0.084 ∗ ∗ ∗ − 0.058 ∗ ∗ − 0.099 ∗ ∗ ∗ − 0.047 ∗ ∗ 
(0.026) (0.026) (0.026) (0.023) (0.026) (0.023) 
Blue collar − 0.113 ∗ ∗ ∗ − 0.096 ∗ ∗ ∗ − 0.098 ∗ ∗ ∗ − 0.061 ∗ ∗ − 0.108 ∗ ∗ ∗ − 0.041 
(0.028) (0.028) (0.028) (0.025) (0.028) (0.025) 
Entrepreneur (reference category) 
No. of observations 5,601 5,601 5,601 5,601 5,601 5,601 
Notes: Standard errors are reported in parenthesis. ∗ p -value < .10, ∗ ∗ p -value < .05, ∗ ∗ ∗ p -value < .01. Control variables are: 
(2) having worked and having received a scholarship during university; (3) job stability and its square term, job independence 
and its square term; (4) age at enrolment and its square term, vocational high school track, high school ﬁnal mark, university 
in the South, ﬁeld of study, standardised university grade, interaction between South university and standardised university 
grade, dummies for graduation with delay, having passed the licensing exam 3 years and 5 years after graduation; (5) graduate 
liberal professional mother with the same degree, non-graduate or graduate with ad diﬀerent degree liberal professional 
mother, non-graduate and non-liberal professional father; (6) all control variables. Sample of graduates who chose a degree 
with access to liberal professions which require a compulsory period of practice, completed a compulsory practice period and 
passed a licensing exam. 
tically signiﬁcant average marginal eﬀect on the probability to start a 
liberal profession but of opposite sign to the one expected (see Table 
A4). Because higher quality human capital decreases the probability to 
start a liberal professional, we infer that the selection into starting a 
liberal profession is not meritocratic. The lack of meritocracy makes us 
also think that it is not the transmission of job speciﬁc skills that pro- 
vides an advantage to children of graduate liberal professionals with the 
same degree, but rather the transmission of the business or nepotism. To 
better disentangle these two residual mechanisms, we also estimate the 
average marginal eﬀect of having a liberal professional father excluding 
all individuals who are working in a family business 5 years after grad- 
uation irrelevant of their occupation. We ﬁnd that the eﬀect of having 
a liberal professional fathers with the same degree, after controlling for 
all covariates, becomes statistically insigniﬁcant (see Appendix A Table 
A7), which suggests that the inheritance of the family business plays a 
big role in explaining the probability to start a liberal profession. 
In conclusion, our main ﬁndings are the following: (i) the largest ef- 
fect of having a liberal professional father is observed when a father has 
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the same degree as his child, (ii) having a father liberal professional does 
not increase the probability to choose a degree with access to liberal pro- 
fessions requiring a compulsory practice; (iii) the transmission of human 
capital (probably both formal and informal) is the main mechanism ex- 
plaining the probability to complete a compulsory period of practice 
followed by family networking and/or nepotism; (iv) the transmission 
of formal human capital is the main and only mechanism explaining the 
probability to pass a licensing exam after completed a compulsory pe- 
riod of practice; (v) the transmission of the family business and probably 
nepotism are the main mechanisms explaining the probability to start a 
liberal profession after completed a compulsory period of practice and 
passed a licensing exam. 
8. Conclusions 
In this paper we studied the mechanisms and processes of trans- 
mission of liberal professions from fathers to children. Using data on 
22 Italian universities, we ﬁnd that there is a very strong intergenera- 
tional transmission. The odds of being a liberal professional for children 
of liberal professionals is twice the corresponding odds for children of 
non-professionals and it is especially large for liberal professions with 
high entry barriers, in particular accountants, lawyers, notaries, psy- 
chologists, pharmacists and architects for which a compulsory period of 
practice is required. 
Our empirical results also suggest that nepotism does not play a role 
in explaining the probability of passing a licensing exam, but it might 
explain the probability of starting a liberal profession once a licensing 
exam is passed and as a matter of fact we ﬁnd a negative relationship 
between formal human capital and the probability to start a liberal pro- 
fession. Furthermore, the transmission of the family business seems to 
play a substantial role in explaining the eﬀect of having a father liberal 
professional with the same degree on the probability to start a liberal 
profession. The process of completing a compulsory period of practice is 
at least in part meritocratic, but it can also be partly explained by family 
networking which disproportionably advantages children of liberal pro- 
fessionals. This would suggest that high-ability children with no family 
members in the profession could be helped in starting a liberal profes- 
sion by introducing (i) mentoring schemes where senior professionals 
get incentives to provide advice and help prospective professionals, (ii) 
programmes to help graduates in ﬁnding members of the relevant pro- 
fessional body available to supervise them for a period of practice, (iii) 
liberalisation reforms that increase competition and lower the entry bar- 
rier. Fairlie and Robb (2007) draw a similar type of conclusion from 
their study on the eﬀect of having a father who is a business owner on 
the probability of children to become self-employed. 
Our ﬁndings are aligned with previous empirical evidence on liberal 
professions in Italy suggesting that one of the main reasons for the in- 
tergenerational transmission is that having a liberal professional father 
helps in lowering the entry barrier and this might lead to favouritism 
(see Mocetti, 2016 , for pharmacists, Pellizzari and Pica, 2011 and 
Basso and Pellizzari, 2010 , for lawyers). Our study generalises previous 
studies to all types of liberal professions by providing evidence that part 
of the intergenerational transmission of liberal professions is explained 
by transmission of the family business, networking and potentially nepo- 
tism. 
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